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Abstract
A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear
income tax schedule will result in an ine±ciently high tax rate whenever the median voter has
a below average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare
assessment. We ¯nd that the ine±ciency in the voting equilibrium is the lower, the higher the
average level of tax avoidance in the economy, or equivalently, the lower the median voter's
amount of avoidance. The result holds for endogenous avoidance and labor choice and, under
certain conditions, for an endogenous enforcement policy.
JEL classi¯cation: H26; D72; D6.
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Income tax avoidance looms large. For the U.S. the income tax gap is estimated at a total of
$ 345 billion { more than 15 percent of the actual tax liability (Slemrod, 2007). Lang et al. (1997)
suggest that tax avoidance in Germany accounts for a loss of one third of income taxes paid. They
further show that avoidance activities are quite heterogonously allocated among the population.
As a result, the distribution of true incomes di®ers substantially from the distribution of taxed
incomes (see also Johns and Slemrod, 2008). When it comes to redistributive taxation, con°icting
interest not only emerge between the rich and the poor but also between those who avoid taxes
and those who do not.
Despite the apparent economic signi¯cance, a large part of the political economy analysis of
taxation neglects avoidance behavior. Only a few recent contributions consider the implications of
tax evasion and avoidance on voting over taxes (Barbaro and Suedekum, 2009; Borck, 2009; Traxler,
2009). However, none of these papers studies the role of tax avoidance for the welfare assessment
of the voting outcome. The present study aims to close this gap in the literature. Building on one
of the cornerstones of the political economy of taxation { the result that, whenever the median
voter has a below average income, majority voting over linear income tax schedules will result in
an ine±ciently high tax rate { we examine whether tax avoidance will aggravate or mitigate the
ine±ciency.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we introduce a model of tax avoidance in the spirit of
Slemrod (1994). Individuals decide on legal but costly activities that minimize their tax liability.
For instance, taxpayers might shift income into untaxed fringe bene¯ts, into preferentially-taxed
capital gains, or into the future (e.g., via pension plans) (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). Taking
labor supply and tax enforcement activities as exogenously given, section 2 studies majority voting
over a linear income tax schedule with endogenous tax avoidance. We show that the median voter
theorem is applicable and that the decisive voter is the taxpayer with the median taxed income
rather than the median true income. This replicates similar results in Roine (2006), Borck (2009)
and Traxler (2009).
We then compare the linear income tax scheme that wins majority voting with the welfare-
optimal tax policy (section 3). One obtains the analogue to the well-known benchmark in the
voting literature: whenever the median voter's taxed income is below the average taxed income,
the political process will result in an ine±ciently high tax rate. The political ine±ciency will be
1the smaller, however, the higher the average level of tax avoidance is in the economy. The intuition
behind this observation is quite simple: keeping the median voter's tax avoidance constant, a higher
amount of avoidance reduces the social costs from increasing the tax rate. With more avoidance,
the gap between the marginal costs of taxation considered by the planner and the decisive voter will
become smaller. An increase in avoidance therefore brings the second-best tax rate closer to the
tax rate selected by the voters. One can derive an equivalent statement for the pivotal taxpayer.
The lower the median voter's amount of tax avoidance, the smaller is the political ine±ciency. The
less the pivotal taxpayer avoids, the higher are her marginal costs from increasing the tax rate.
This induces an incentive to vote for `too low taxes', which works into the opposite direction as the
inclination to vote for `too high taxes' that derives from a below average true income.
These ¯ndings have several implications. First, we note that a su±ciently high level of tax
avoidance may turn a right-skewed income distribution into a left-skewed distribution of taxed
incomes. This would imply that majority voting results in an ine±ciently low tax rate. Second,
the ine±ciency in the voting equilibrium will be smaller under tax avoidance patterns where the
rich and { especially for a more concave social welfare function { the poor engage more heavily
in avoidance than the middle class. While the ¯rst observation is mainly of theoretical interest
{ the observed distribution of taxed income is typically skewed to the right in modern economies
(Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997) { the latter scenario ¯nds ample empirical support (Cox, 1984;
Fratanduono, 1986; Johns and Slemrod, 2008).
Section 4 studies several extensions of the basic analysis. We ¯rst demonstrate, that our results
hold with an endogenous labor choice. Next we show that the analysis can be generalized from
legal avoidance to the case of illegal tax evasion. Once we endogenize the level of tax enforcement,
however, our ¯ndings only hold under certain assumptions on individuals' avoidance technology.
The reason for this restriction is related to the result from Slemrod (1994), who shows that the
optimal progressivity of the income tax depends on the level of enforcement. In our case, the
second-best tax policy as well as the voting outcome depend on the extent of tax enforcement. In
turn, the impact of tax avoidance on the welfare properties of the voting equilibrium relies on the
endogenous enforcement policy.
Our analysis links the literature on tax avoidance with the classical political economic work on
voting over taxation (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). As noted above,
there are only a few contributions studying similar problems. Borck (2009) considers tax evasion
and voting over redistribution for risk-averse taxpayers. Roine (2006) studies majority voting on
2taxes when agents can make a discrete avoidance decision. Traxler (2009) introduces a reduced-
form model of tax evasion that generalizes the results from Roine (2006) and Borck (2009). The
main lesson from these contributions is that tax evasion and avoidance drives a wedge between the
ranking of true and taxed income. In turn, this can shift the position of the decisive voter away
from the median income receiver which implies unusual patterns of redistribution (e.g., an `ends
against the middle' con°ict). None of these papers, however, addresses the welfare implications of
tax avoidance. While there exists a growing literature on the welfare consequences of evasion and
avoidance and its role for the optimal income taxation { see Cremer and Gahvari (1994, 1996),
Slemrod (1994) and the more recent work by Kopczuk (2001) and Chetty (2009) { the present
paper has a di®erent focus. Instead of providing a general welfare analysis of tax avoidance, we
study its consequences for the welfare assessment of the political economy outcome. Our analysis
thus focusses on the link between avoidance and the political ine±ciency introduced by the voting
process. Hence, the welfare analysis presented here is novel in the literature.
2 Majority voting and tax avoidance
The economy is represented by a continuum of taxpayers with unit mass. Each taxpayer has
an exogenous income y which is distributed according to a cdf F(y). (Section 4 discusses the
case of endogenous labor supply.) Income is taxed at rate t, however, taxpayers can engage in
costly activities that reduce the tax liability by the amount a. The non tax-deductible costs for
avoiding taxes are given by K(a;e;y). Next to a and y, these costs also depend on the government's
expenditures on tax enforcement e, which subsumes any costly activities that broaden the tax base.
Avoidance costs are increasing and strictly convex in a, Ka ¸ 0, Kaa > 0. Kay, which re°ects how
marginal avoidance costs vary across income, may be locally positive or negative. In section 4,
where we consider the endogenous choice of e, we will further assume that it is more costly to avoid
taxes the higher the level of tax enforcement, Ke > 0 and Kae > 0 for a > 0.




U(C) s.t. C = y + g ¡ t(y ¡ a) ¡ K(a;e;y),
3where g is a lump-sum transfer. Optimal avoidance a¤ is characterized by the ¯rst-order condition1
Ka(a¤;e;y) = t. (1)
The budget balancing transfer is given by tax revenues net of enforcement costs,
g(e;t) = t
Z
Z(y)dF ¡ e = t ¹ Z ¡ e, (2)
where Z(y) := y¡a¤(y) captures the e®ectively taxed income of an agent with income y, avoidance
a¤(y) and ¹ Z denotes the average e®ective tax base in the economy.
Let us now turn to the voting process. An agent's most preferred tax rate is the solution to
max
t
U(C) s.t. C = y + g(e;t) ¡ t(y ¡ a¤) ¡ K(a¤;e;y)





The most preferred tax rate equalizes a taxpayer's marginal costs from a higher tax rate, given by
Z(y), with marginal bene¯ts. Voters' preferences can be ranked according to their taxed income {
the higher Z, the lower the preferred tax rate. The monotonicity of preferences in Z assures that
the median voter theorem is applicable (see appendix), and the pivotal taxpayer is the one with
the median level of Z(y). Denoting the distribution function of Z = Z(y) by H(Z), we arrive at
Proposition 1 The tax rate that wins majority voting is given by ^ Z = @g=@t, where ^ Z is the
median level of taxed income in the economy, H( ^ Z) = 1=2.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 characterizes the political equilibrium when tax avoidance is possible. The out-
come is similar to the standard median voter result (Romer 1975; Roberts 1977; Meltzer and
Richard 1981). The key di®erence is that the pivotal taxpayer is the agent with median taxed
income ^ Z { which is not necessarily identical to the one with the median true income. As discussed
in the literature, tax avoidance and tax evasion can drive a wedge between the ranking of true and
1Corner solutions are excluded by assuming Ka(0;e;y) = 0 and lima!y Ka(a;e;y) = 1.
4taxed income (Borck 2009; Roine 2006; Traxler 2009). As a results, this can shift the position of
the decisive voter away from the median true income receiver. In our framework, the decisive voter
may di®er from the median income receiver if Z were non-monotonic in y, i.e., if taxed income
were locally decreasing in income.2 While this can give rise to unusual coalitions supporting an
equilibrium (e.g. a coalition of rich and poor), the conditions for and the implications of such a
non-monotonicity are closely discussed in Traxler (2009). Here we focus on assessing the welfare
properties of the median voter equilibrium which hold independently of whether or not the median
voter corresponds to the taxpayer with median true income.
3 Welfare Analysis
We compare this political outcome with the tax rate a planner would choose to maximize social
welfare
R
W[U (C(y;a¤(y)))]dF, W0 > 0 ¸ W00. Taking into account taxpayers' avoidance behavior




W[U (y + g(e;t) ¡ tZ(y) ¡ K (a¤(y);e;y))]dF s.t. (1) and (2).
Making use of (1) and rearranging, we obtain the ¯rst-order condition
Z






¹ W0 ¹ U0 and ¹ W0 ¹ U0 :=
Z
W0[U(:)]U0(:)dF. (5)
Denoting the left hand side of (4), the marginal social costs of increasing t, as ¹ ZÃ, the comparison
with the majority voting outcome characterized in Proposition 1 yields the following result:3
Proposition 2 The median voter equilibrium is characterized by (a) an ine±ciently high (b) an
ine±ciently low (c) the second-best tax rate i® (a) ^ Z < ¹ ZÃ (b) ^ Z > ¹ ZÃ (c) ^ Z = ¹ ZÃ, respectively.
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition extends the standard result on the welfare properties of the median voter
equilibrium to the case of tax avoidance. Consider ¯rst the case without avoidance and hence
2This would be the case if an income increase would be accompanied by a su±ciently strong increase in tax
avoidance (driven by lower marginal avoidance costs, Kay < 0) such that the e®ectively taxed income Z would
decline.
3We will call a tax ine±ciently low [high], if it results in a lower [higher] tax rate as compared to the solution
given by (4).
5Z(y) = y. For any income distribution where the median voter's income is below the average
(welfare-weighted) income, ^ y < ¹ yÃ, the pivotal taxpayer faces marginal costs from taxation which
are below the marginal social costs. The political equilibrium will be characterized by an ine±ciently
high tax rate. For the case with tax avoidance we get the same result as long as the decisive voter
has a taxed income below the (welfare-weighted) average, ^ Z < ¹ ZÃ (case a). If the opposite holds
true, i.e., if the decisive taxpayer has a taxed income ^ Z > ¹ ZÃ (case b), majority voting results in an
ine±ciently low tax rate. For ^ Z = ¹ ZÃ (case c), voting does not introduce any (further) ine±ciency.
To analyze the role of tax avoidance for the welfare assessment of the voting equilibrium, it is
useful to rewrite the condition for case (a) as
¹ a¤
Ã ¡ a¤(^ y) < ¹ yÃ ¡ ^ y. (6)
The left hand side of the condition captures the gap between the average (welfare-weighted) level
of avoidance, ¹ a¤
Ã, and the amount avoided by the pivotal taxpayer, a¤(^ y). In the following, we will
call this the `avoidance gap'. The right hand side of (6) measures the gap between the average
(welfare-weighted) income ¹ yÃ and a decisive voter's true income ^ y, the `income gap'.4 As long as
the avoidance gap is smaller than the income gap, the political process will result in an ine±ciently
high tax rate.
To illustrate the intuition behind condition (6), consider an economy where the decisive tax-
payer's true income coincides with the weighted mean, ^ y = ¹ yÃ. Without tax avoidance, no political
ine±ciency would arise from the voting process. However, if agents di®er with respect to their
avoidance behavior, this will drive a wedge between the social costs of increasing the tax rate and
the costs considered by the pivotal taxpayer. Assume, for instance, that the median voter avoids
less than the average, a¤(^ y) < ¹ a¤
Ã. She then faces marginal costs from increasing t which are above
the marginal social costs. The left hand side of (6) would be positive and the condition would
be violated { we would get ^ Z > ¹ ZÃ and therefore an ine±ciently low tax rate. If the median
voter would avoid more than the weighted average, condition (6) would be met and we obtain the
opposite result.
Now turn to the scenario of a right-skewed income distribution with ^ y < ¹ yÃ, i.e., a case with
a positive income gap. With tax avoidance varying along the income distribution (Kay 6= 0), the
4As we do not rule out non-monotonicities in Z(y), the income of the pivotal taxpayer does not necessarily equal
the median income. Note further that Z(y) is non-injective if Z is non-monotonic. In this case, there could be several
income levels ^ yj and ^ yk, j 6= k, for which ^ Z = Z(^ yj) = Z(^ yk) holds. It is obvious, however, that (6) holds for any ^ yk,
as long as it holds for ^ yj. Therefore we treat ^ y as if it always were unique.
6left hand side of (6) will generally di®er from zero. Whenever the decisive voter avoids less than
the welfare-weighted average, the avoidance gap will be positive and tends to o®set the political
distortion that emerges for ^ y < ¹ yÃ. If the avoidance gap is larger than the income gap, condition
(6) would be violated. Majority voting could then result in an ine±ciently low tax rate { despite
a distribution of true incomes with ^ y < ¹ yÃ. For the alternative scenario where the decisive voter
avoids more than the average, the left hand side of (6) would be negative. The negative avoidance
gap would further amplify the political ine±ciency associated with the income gap. However, the
empirical evidence discussed below suggests that this case is less plausible.
Corollary 1 The higher the average level of tax avoidance and the lower the median voter's tax
avoidance, (i) the lower will be the ine±ciency introduced by majority voting for ^ Z < ¹ ZÃ,
(ii) the higher will be the ine±ciency introduced by majority voting for ^ Z > ¹ ZÃ.
The intuition behind this observation is straightforward. Note ¯rst that the right hand side of
(3) is identical to the right hand side of (4). The social planner and the voters thus consider the
same marginal bene¯ts from increasing the tax rate. All behavioral responses to taxation that shape
the elasticity of the tax base { in particular, changes in tax avoidance (see (A.1) in the appendix)
{ are thus captured equally in the right hand side of (3) and (4). Hence, di®erences in the tax base
elasticity do not impact the welfare assessment of the voting equilibrium. The ine±ciency of the
voting equilibrium, captured by
¯ ¯ ¯ ^ Z ¡ ¹ ZÃ
¯ ¯ ¯, only emerges from the di®erence in the marginal costs
of increasing the tax rate considered by the pivotal taxpayer and the social planner, respectively.
Note that the marginal social costs, ¹ ZÃ, are decreasing in avoidance ¹ a¤
Ã. For case (i), ^ Z < ¹ ZÃ,
where majority voting results in an ine±ciently high tax rate, the political ine±ciency is therefore
the smaller, the higher the average (welfare-weighted) avoidance in the economy: the second-best
tax rate will be closer to the tax that wins the elections. The opposite result applies when majority
voting yields an ine±ciently low tax rate: for case (ii), a higher level of average tax avoidance
means that the political ine±ciency if more pronounced.
Equivalent statements can be made for the avoidance behavior of the decisive voter. The less
the pivotal taxpayer avoids, the higher are his marginal costs from a tax rate increase. This implies
a stronger inclination to vote for `too low taxes', which works into the opposite direction as the
tendency to vote for `too high taxes', that derives from a below weighted-average true income.
In case (i), a decrease in the pivotal taxpayer's avoidance will therefore mitigate the political
ine±ciency associated with majority voting.
7Redistributive Concerns Corollary 1 holds independently of the curvature of the welfare func-
tion. However, redistributive concerns will of course a®ect the weight Ã(y) in (4) and therefore
the level of ¹ yÃ and ¹ a¤
Ã. It is straightforward to show that Ã(y) is strictly decreasing in income for
Ky < 1 ¡ t. Hence, the avoidance behavior of low income groups will get a larger weight than
avoidance among the rich. With stronger social preferences for redistribution, the di®erence in
weights will become more pronounced. Depending on the income{avoidance pattern this could
either result in an increase or a decrease in ¹ a¤
Ã. The point is best illustrated graphically.
Figure 1 plots the true income y (horizontal axis) against the taxed income Z(y) (vertical axis)
for two di®erent avoidance technologies. A vertical deviation from the 45 degree line captures the
amount of avoidance for a given income level. In the example depicted in the left panel, avoidance is
increasing in income such that avoidance is most prevalent among the top of the income distribution.
In the second example, both the rich and the poor engage more actively in tax avoidance than the
middle class taxpayer.5
Figure 1: Patterns of tax avoidance
Consider the special case of a linear social welfare function and say that the decisive voter avoids
less than the (weighted) average in both examples, i.e. a¤(^ y) < ¹ a¤
Ã0.6 Neglecting redistributive
concerns we thus have a positive avoidance gap. This does not necessarily imply, however, that
5The underlying avoidance technology in the ¯rst example satis¯es Kay · 0 8y. In the second example, Kay is
positive for low income levels and turns negative starting with an intermediate income. In both examples, Z(y) is
monotonic in y such that the median income receiver corresponds to the agent with the median taxed income. See
Traxler (2009) for a discussion of cases with non-monotonicities.
6We use the subscript Ã
0 to indicate the welfare weight avoidance level for a linear welfare function (W
00 = 0). In




0, which simply re°ects the concavity
of the utility function.
8we get a positive avoidance gap for the case of a concave welfare function { in particular, for the
scenario in the left panel. If the planner accounts for equity concerns, the amount of avoidance
among the rich obtains a lower weight than the avoidance in the lower tail of the distribution.
Thus, for the avoidance pattern in the left panel of ¯gure 1, the avoidance gap will certainly be
smaller when redistributive concerns are taken into account: ¹ a¤
Ã < ¹ a¤
Ã0. Hence, one might get
¹ a¤
Ã0 > a¤(^ y) > ¹ a¤
Ã, i.e., a positive avoidance gap for a linear but a negative avoidance gap for a
concave welfare function. In contrast, for the scenario depicted in the right panel we might get
a larger avoidance gap with redistributive concerns, ¹ a¤
Ã > ¹ a¤
Ã0 > a¤(^ y), if the welfare weights on
low-income taxpayers' avoidance are su±ciently high.
The lessons to draw from these examples are clear-cut. A patter of avoidance where taxpayers
with intermediate incomes avoid less taxes than the poor and the rich, is more likely to result
in a positive avoidance gap than a pattern with pronounced avoidance `in the middle'. Hence, a
higher level of tax avoidance will be more e®ective in mitigating the political ine±ciency obtained
for ^ Z < ¹ ZÃ (case (i) of corollary 1), if the bulk of avoidance is concentrated among the ends of
the income distribution. With a concave social welfare function, tax avoidance among low income
groups is thereby particularly supportive to push this e®ect.
Empirical Evidence Given the importance of the avoidance-income pattern for the welfare prop-
erties of the political outcome, it is worth discussing empirical evidence on the distribution of tax
avoidance. Little is known on the distribution of legal tax minimizing activities such as the usage of
untaxed fringe bene¯ts, tax-favored types of capital returns or the exploitation of tax loopholes (see
see section 5 in Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). For other activities reducing the e®ective tax base,
such as charity giving, it is hard to distinguish between intrinsically motivated and tax induced
behavior. A common conjecture is that higher income receivers have access to more tax avoidance
strategies. This view is supported by the evidence in Lang et al. (1997).
Slightly more is know about the distribution of illegal tax evasion.7 It is argued that richer
taxpayers also have better access to evasion technologies which are related to receiving unmatched
income. Bloomquist (2003) reports, for instance, that middle-income taxpayers have the highest
share { above 90% { of third party reported, matched income. Receiving unmatched income appears
to be crucial, at least for tax evasion opportunities. Based on data from the IRS, the underreporting
rate is estimated to be 54%, 8.5%, and 4.5% for income types subject to `little or no', `some', and
7In the next section we discuss to which extent our results apply to the case of tax evasion.
9`substantial' information reporting, respectively (Slemrod, 2007, p.30). It is thus not surprising
that only 1% of wage and salaries but 57% of nonfarm proprietor income were not reported in
2001.
In a comprehensive analysis of micro data from the National Research Program, Johns and
Slemrod (2008) show that misreporting of income (as a fraction of true income) is increasing in true
income. This evidence supports a pattern as depicted in the left panel of ¯gure 1. When refundable
tax credits are taken into account, Johns and Slemrod document a U-shaped relationship between
adjusted gross income and misreporting. Based on random audit data, Cox (1984) and Fratanduono
(1986) also ¯nd a U-shaped relationship between income and evasion { with the smallest amount
of evasion among taxpayers around the median income level. The latter ¯ndings lend support to
the pattern on the right of ¯gure 1.
4 Extensions
The analysis of the previous sections employed two strong assumptions. Individual incomes as well
as the extent of tax enforcement were considered to be exogenously given. How robust are our
results when we relax these assumptions? And to which extent do our results generalize to the case
of illegal tax evasion rather than legal avoidance?
4.1 Endogenous Labor Supply The endogenous labor choice turns out to be irrelevant for
our ¯ndings. Allowing for this additional behavioral response to taxation, one arrives at the same
qualitative results as with a ¯xed income. The robustness of our ¯ndings is basically an implication
of the fact that taxpayers' behavior { which shapes the elasticity of the tax base { is captured in the
right hand side of conditions (3) and (4). As discussed in the previous section, the expression is the
same in both conditions. Thus, changes in the tax base elasticity that a®ect @g=@t do not alter the
welfare assessment of the median voter equilibrium. This point is made explicitly in appendix C,
which sketches the endogenous labor choice when taxpayers have heterogenous skill levels.
4.2 Endogenous Enforcement The assumption of an exogenously given tax enforcement is more
crucial for our results. We therefore study an extension with an endogenous enforcement choice.
10We focus on the case where e is set by a revenue maximizing authority.8 The following timing
of events is considered: First, the tax rate is determined by the political process or the social
planner, second, the enforcement authority chooses the revenue maximizing level of enforcement
and, ¯nally, taxpayers decide on avoidance. With this timing, the enforcement authority sets e
in order to maximize g(e;t) from (2), taking into account taxpayers' avoidance responses. The






dF = 1. (7)
From (1) and Kae > 0 it follows that @a¤=@e < 0. Implicitly di®erentiating (7) and assuming
@2a¤=@e2 > 0, one obtains @eR=@t > 0. The authority responds with an increase of enforcement to
an increase in the tax rate. In this sense, the tax rate and tax enforcement are complementary.
Taking the authority's choice of eR into account and substituting for (1), the most preferred








In addition to the ¯rst-order marginal costs from an increase in t, voters now face further costs
that emerge from the endogenous increase in enforcement. With these additional costs of taxa-
tion, voters' preferences over t are no longer monotonic in Z(y). The median voter theorem can














As discussed in appendix A, this condition assures that preferences over (g;t) are monotonic in
income.
8Qualitatively similar results are obtained for a welfare-maximizing choice of enforcement. However, the compar-
ison with the result established above is more straightforward for a revenue maximizing policy. A further interesting
extension would be to study voting over t and e. It turns out, however, that the problem has in general no Condorcet
winner. A closer examination of the two dimensional voting problem (e.g., based on a structure-induced equilibrium
approach; Shepsle, 1979) is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
9Whenever Kay ¸ 0, then @a
¤=@y ¸ 0. The inequality will therefore hold under a mild (strict) constraint on Key,
if the term in the round brackets of (9) is non-negative (negative). Whenever Kay < 0, the inequality will be met
under a mild (strict) constraint on Key, if the expression in the round brackets is negative (non-negative). Compare
the discussion at the end of this subsection.
11Proposition 3 Assume (9) is satis¯ed. With an endogenous, revenue maximizing choice of en-
forcement, the tax rate that wins majority voting is given by







with F(^ y) = 1=2.
Proof. See appendix.
In contrast to proposition 1, the new voting equilibrium requires monotonicity of preferences
in true rather than taxed income. The pivotal taxpayer is thus always the one with median true
income. We now compare this voting equilibrium with the welfare-maximizing tax policy. Following













Denoting the condition's left hand side, the marginal social costs of increasing t, as ¹ zÃ, and the
marginal costs faced by the median voter (the left hand side of (8) evaluated at ^ y) as ^ z, we can
state:
Proposition 4 With an endogenous, revenue maximizing choice of enforcement, the median voter
equilibrium is characterized by (a) an ine±ciently high (b) an ine±ciently low (c) the second-best
tax rate i® (a) ^ z < ¹ zÃ (b) ^ z > ¹ zÃ (c) ^ z = ¹ zÃ, respectively.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the proof of proposition 2.
The proposition is analogous to the one derived for exogenous enforcement expenditures. A
welfare assessment of the political outcome requires to compare the marginal social costs with the
median income receiver's costs of taxation, which now includes a term re°ecting the endogenous
adjustment in tax enforcement. Rearranging terms, we can write ^ z < ¹ zÃ as
¹ a¤
Ã ¡ a¤(^ y) ¡ [¹ ·Ã ¡ ·(^ y)]
@eR
@t
< ¹ yÃ ¡ ^ y, (11)
with ¹ ·Ã :=
R
Ã(y)Ke(a¤(y);eR;y)dF and ·(^ y) := Ke(a¤(^ y);eR; ^ y)). As in (6), the condition con-
tains the avoidance gap on the left and the income gap on the right hand side. The new term
12on the left captures the di®erence between the marginal social and the median voter's marginal
enforcement costs. This additional term, the `cost gap', has a crucial impact on our analysis.
Recall that @eR=@t > 0 and note that the cost gap will be positive, if the social are above
the median voter's marginal costs of raising e, ¹ ·Ã > ·(^ y). A positive cost gap means that the
pivotal taxpayer considers lower second-order costs of raising t than the planner. This will work
against any positive avoidance gap. The left hand side of (11), the sum of avoidance and cost gap,
can nevertheless be positive but the conditions for this case are di±cult to establish in general. In
particular, the statement from corollary 1 does not immediately apply without further assumptions.
We have established earlier that the political ine±ciency which emerges when the median voter
has a taxed income below the welfare-weighted average ( ^ Z < ¹ ZÃ) is smaller, the less the median
voter avoids and the higher the average avoidance level is. When tax enforcement is endogenous,
this is not necessarily true. To see this, note that the cost gap as well as the avoidance gap are
both decreasing in a¤(^ y) (recall that Kae > 0). The left hand side of (11) will be decreasing in the





holds for y = ^ y. Thus, for a su±ciently small response of enforcement to taxes and for a su±ciently
small increase of marginal avoidance costs in enforcement, a lower level of a¤(^ y) will still increase
the left hand side of (11), thereby working against any positive income gap. When the condition
holds for any y, this is su±cient to assure that the sum of avoidance and cost gap is also increasing
in ¹ a¤
Ã, the average weighted amount of avoidance.
Corollary 2 Assume that (9) and (12) are jointly satis¯ed. The higher the average level of tax
avoidance and the lower the median voter's tax avoidance,
(i) the lower will be the ine±ciency introduced by majority voting for ^ z < ¹ zÃ,
(ii) the higher will be the ine±ciency introduced by majority voting for ^ z > ¹ zÃ.
Whenever the avoidance technology satis¯es (9) and (12), we arrive at a qualitatively identical
result as above. A higher level of average avoidance has two implications. It reduces the average
tax base in the economy, thus lowering the marginal social costs of raising the tax rate. At the
same time, the second-order costs from taxation from the endogenous response in tax enforcement
will be higher. This latter e®ect tends to raise the marginal social costs. If (12) holds, the former
13e®ect will dominate the latter. For case (i), a higher level of average avoidance thus moves the
second-best tax rate closer to the median voter's most preferred tax rate. The opposite holds true
for case (ii). In this case, more avoidance would push the second-best tax further away from the
(ine±ciently low) tax rate that wins majority voting. Similar as above, equivalent statements can
be made for the pivotal taxpayer's amount of avoidance.
It is important to note that corollary 2 only holds under relatively restrictive conditions on the
avoidance technology. This becomes obvious when (9) and (12) are combined to yield
1 ¡ ¹ < Kae(:)@eR











If @a¤(y)=@y > 0 (which requires Kay < 0), the numerator of ¹ must be positive (i.e., Key >
¡ 1
@eR=@t) to allow (9) and (12) to jointly hold. Otherwise, for @a¤(y)=@y · 0 (Kay ¸ 0), the
condition can in principle hold for a positive or a negative ¹. If Key > ¡ 1
@eR=@t and thus ¹ < 0,
condition (12) is already su±cient for (9) to hold. (Note that there exists a broad class of simple
functions which jointly satisfy Kay ¸ 0 and Key ¸ 0 (e.g. K(:) = a2ey=2).)
4.3 Avoidance versus Evasion Finally, let us examine whether the results from the previous
section can also be interpreted in terms of illegal tax evasion rather than legal avoidance. Consider
the following evasion costs ~ K(:) := past + k(a;y), where p represents the chance of an audit, ast
is the ¯ne imposed on evading at taxes and k(:) denotes transaction costs of concealing income.10
Assuming risk neutrality, the taxpayer's problem becomes
max
a
C = y + g ¡ t(y ¡ a) ¡ past ¡ k(a;y)
and the optimal evasion a¤ is given by
ka(a¤;y) = t(1 ¡ ps), (13)
10This function ~ K(:) can be derived from a framework where individual consumption is given by C+ = (1 ¡ t)y +
at + g ¡ k(:) if evasion remains undetected and C¡ = (1 ¡ t)y ¡ at(s ¡ 1) + g ¡ k(:) in case of detection, where s > 1
is the ¯ne rate and we assume ps < 1.
14where ps < 1. The condition has a similar structure as the one from (1). Making use of the envelope





with Z0(y) := y ¡a¤(y)(1¡ps). The pivotal taxpayer is now the agent with median level of Z0(y),
^ Z0. The welfare properties of the voting equilibrium are characterized by the di®erence between ^ Z0





Ã ¡ a¤(^ y)
¢
< ¹ yÃ ¡ ^ y. (15)
The intuition behind this condition is analogous to the one from (6). The fact that the left hand
side of (15) captures the gap in concealed income net of expected ¯nes rather than the avoidance
gap alters the analysis only quantitatively.11
Admittedly, this result is derived in a strongly simpli¯ed model of tax evasion. If we would
allow for risk aversion and consider a more general structure of ¯nes, the comparison of avoidance
and evasion becomes less clear. Typically, (i) one requires additional constraints to assure the
applicability of the median voter theorem and, similar as in Section 4.2, (ii) one might obtain an
additional term in (15) that re°ects the di®erences in the marginal impact of the tax rate on the
¯ne. However, the basic mechanism behind corollary 1 and 2 would nevertheless be at work.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the role of tax avoidance for the welfare assessment of majority voting
over a linear income tax schedule. Taxpayers di®er with respect to their true income as well as
their endogenous level of avoidance. Hence, there are two layers of heterogeneity which can drive
a wedge between the tax rate preferred by the median voter and the welfare-optimal policy. We
found that, for a right-skewed distribution of true incomes, a higher level of tax avoidance mitigates
the ine±ciency in the voting equilibrium. The result is particularly relevant for the empirically
plausible case where taxpayers on both ends of the income distribution engage more intensively
11The revenues collected from auditing taxpayers would of course enter (2) and thus @g=@t. However, since this
term equally appears on the right hand side of conditions (3) and (4), neither the distinction between tax evasion
and tax avoidance nor the distinction between individual costs that generate revenues, past in our case, and purely
wasteful costs, k(:), does a®ect the results from proposition 2 and corollary 1. See Chetty (2009) for a related
discussion on these di®erent types of cost.
15in tax minimizing behavior than the middle class. Given the magnitude of tax avoidance, this
argument seems to deserve more attention in the political economics of taxation.
Our framework may serve as a starting point for several fruitful extensions. One could in-
clude an occupational choice decision in the model, which would allow to endogenize heterogenous
avoidance costs. Such an extension would also provide a framework to study the extent to which
tax authorities should concentrate their enforcement activities on di®erent occupational and dif-
ferent income groups, respectively. With two layers of heterogeneity { heterogenous incomes and
heterogenous tax avoidance { tax enforcement becomes crucial for horizontal and vertical equity
considerations (Kopczuk, 2001). The analysis presented in this paper points to potential congru-
ences and con°icts between redistributive targets and allocative costs of tax enforcement within a
political economic framework.
From an empirical perspective, it would be interesting to compare the magnitude of the gap
between the median and the mean income for the observed, taxed income as well as for the hy-
pothetical case without any tax avoidance or evasion. While the obvious di±culties to measure
tax minimizing behavior severely complicate this task, the data on the distribution of taxed and
true income used by Johns and Slemrod (2008) seem to be a good starting point. Such an analysis
would also allow to address the implications of evasion and avoidance for the optimal tax rate as
recently pointed out in Chetty (2009).
16Appendix
A. Second-order and single-crossing conditions
From (2) we obtain
dg(t;eR(t))
dt

















































@t2 < 0 (A.2)
where @eR=@t = @2eR=@t2 = 0 for an exogenously ¯xed enforcement level (sections 2 and 3). In
this case, @2a¤=@t2 > 0 is su±cient for g to be concave in t. For the extension with endogenous
enforcement expenditures, (A.2) is assumed to hold.






@t2 < 0. (A.3)
While the ¯rst term is positive (as Kaa > 0), the second is strictly negative. Given that the latter
expressions dominate, the condition holds and voters' preferences are single-peaked. But even if the
second-order condition would be violated, the median voter theorem can nevertheless be applied,
as the single-crossing condition always holds (Gans and Smart, 1996). To see this, we derive the










Hence, voters' preferences over the (g;t) space are monotonic in Z(y).





¢2 F2 + W0(:)U00(:)F2 + W0(:)U0(:)S
i
dF < 0 (A.4)
where F := ¡Z + @g=@t and S is given by (A.3). The condition holds due to (A.3) and W00 · 0,
U00 < 0 .


























dt2 < 0. (A.5)
While the ¯rst term is strictly positive, the second, third and the last term are strictly negative (due
to (A.2)). The sign of the remaining two terms are ambiguous in general. With Kee su±ciently
large and eR being convex in t, the voting problem under endogenous enforcement will be concave.
Even if concavity would be violated, voters' preferences over the (g;t) space are monotonic in y, if













Finally, the concavity of W(:) and U(:) together with (A.5) assures that the second-order
condition to (10) is satis¯ed.
B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let ^ t denote the tax rate preferred by the agent with taxed income
^ Z. Consider a vote between ^ t and any tax rate t0 with t0 < ^ t. The higher tax rate ^ t will be clearly
preferred by all agents with Z · ^ Z. Hence, the fraction of the population that prefers t0 over ^ t
is smaller than H( ^ Z) = 1=2. From this follows that no tax rate lower than ^ t can defeat ^ t by an
absolute majority. The same argument implies that no tax rater higher than ^ t can win a majority
vote against ^ t.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given that ^ Z and ¹ ZÃ are strictly positive, there has to hold @g=@t > 0
for the voting equilibrium as well as for the welfare-maximizing tax rate. With (A.2), Proposition 2
then follows from the comparison of (3) with (4), with the ¯rst condition being evaluated at
Z(y) = ^ Z.
Proof of Proposition 3. If (9) is satis¯ed, it follows from (A.6) that single crossing holds
and voters' preferences are monotonic in y. Following the arguments applied in the Proof of
Proposition 1 one immediately arrives at Proposition 3.
18C. Endogenous Income
Let us brie°y consider the case of an endogenous income. An exogenously given skill (wage) w is
distributed according to a cdf ©(w) and income is given by y = wL, where L denotes the labor
supply. We follow Slemrod (1994), assuming K(a;e;w). Preferences over consumption C and labor
L are described by U(C;L) and the taxpayer's new problem is
max
a;C;L
U(C;L) s.t. C = wL + g ¡ t(wL ¡ a) ¡ K(a;e;w)
Optimal avoidance a¤ and labor supply L¤ is characterized by the ¯rst-order conditions
t = Ka(a¤;e;w), (A.7)
UC(:) w(1 ¡ t) + UL(:) = 0 (A.8)




where Z(w) = wL¤(w)¡a¤(w) captures the e®ectively taxed income of an agent with skill w. The
taxpayers' voting problem is
max
t
U(C;L) s.t. C = wL¤(w) + g(e;t) ¡ t(wL¤(w) ¡ a¤(w)) ¡ K(a¤(w);e;w),








where we have substituted for (A.7) and (A.8). Quantitatively, a di®erence to the model presented
in the main text is that @g=@t now includes a term re°ecting the labor elasticity which was absent
before. Qualitatively, however, we get the same result as in the main text. From the analysis of
the model with exogenous income it follows that voters' preferences are monotonic in Z(w). The
median voter theorem is applicable and the voting equilibrium is characterized analogously to the
one from Proposition 1. It is straightforward to show that the welfare analysis equally extends to
the case of endogenous labor supply.
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